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intRoduction
Frequent reports of human and technical se-
curity failures in systems highlight the need 
for designing usable security, but specifying 
usable and secure systems is easier said than 
done. Understanding why security controls are 
unusable means factoring in the characteristics 
of people using controls, the work they carry out 
while using controls, and the physical, social, 
and even cultural contexts within which the 
controls are used. While it is accepted wisdom 
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Understanding how to better elicit, specify, and manage requirements for secure and usable software systems 
is a key challenge in security software engineering, however, there lacks tool-support for specifying and man-
aging the voluminous amounts of data the associated analysis yields. Without these tools, the subjectivity of 
analysis may increase as design activities progress. This paper describes CAIRIS (Computer Aided Integration 
of Requirements and Information Security), a step toward tool-support for usable secure requirements engi-
neering. CAIRIS not only manages the elements associated with task, requirements, and risk analysis, it also 
supports subsequent analysis using novel approaches for analysing and visualising security and usability. The 
authors illustrate an application of CAIRIS by describing how it was used to support requirements analysis 
in a critical infrastructure case study.
that these concerns should be treated as early 
as possible, eliciting and specifying require-
ments for secure and usable controls remains 
a hit-and-miss affair.
Requirements Engineering involves under-
standing the problem domain within which a 
system is situated, obtaining data from stake-
holders in this domain, analysing this data to 
elicit a set of requirements, validating these 
requirements, and managing their evolution. 
When properly applied, techniques from HCI 
and Information Security complement these 
early stages of Requirements Engineering. 
Techniques used by usability professionals 
are grounded in observational, performance, DOI: 10.4018/jsse.2010070104
International Journal of Secure Software Engineering, 1(3), 56-70, July-September 2010   57
Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global
is prohibited.
and other qualitative and quantitative data. If 
used properly, this usability data can immerse 
analysts and stakeholders in the problem do-
main and help explore assumptions held about 
threats and vulnerabilities. Similarly, Goal-
Oriented Requirements Engineering techniques 
are not only useful for eliciting requirements 
from goals, but also threats from anti-goals 
(Lamsweerde, 2004). Even the traditional 
workshop setting, where requirements are often 
elicited and validated, can support the design 
of usable security; participative approaches 
to risk analysis, e.g., (Fléchais et al., 2007; 
Braber et al., 2007) help stakeholders take a 
situated approach to security by alerting them 
to threats and vulnerabilities, identifying risks 
in their environment, and directing mitigating 
specification and design decisions.
The challenge of specifying usable and 
secure software systems comes not only from 
choosing the right combination of techniques, 
but also from analysing and managing the data 
arising from them. For non-trivial systems, risk 
and requirements analysis precipitate volumi-
nous amounts of data. A requirement may be 
the leaf node of a large goal-tree, the root goal 
of which may be derived from mitigating a par-
ticular risk; this mitigation response may arise 
as a result of a chain of risk and requirements 
analysis. Furthermore, empirical usability data 
needs to contribute to any design decisions; if we 
mitigate one risk, the resulting usability impact 
of this design decision may introduce others. 
Risk and usability ratings for a system design 
are also coloured by analyst perceptions; this 
allows human error to creep into any valuation.
Without tool-support, the security-usability 
balance can become uneven and overly subjec-
tive as risk analysis becomes more advanced. 
We need tool-support to manage security, 
usability, and requirements data, automate its 
analysis, and convey the results to stakehold-
ers. This paper discusses CAIRIS (Computer 
Aided Integration of Requirements and Risk 
Analysis): a tool for managing the elements 
arising from usability, requirements, and risk 
analysis. This tool supports the elicitation of 
requirements from goals and tasks, and risks 
from threats and vulnerabilities. By structur-
ing elicited data according to a meta-model for 
usable secure requirements engineering (Faily 
& Fléchais, 2010), meaningful traceability 
links between different model types can be 
automatically maintained, allowing data to be 
quickly analysed and visualised in a participa-
tive workshop setting. In the next section, we 
describe the related work motivating CAIRIS. 
In the subsequent sections, we introducing the 
tool, and we describe how CAIRIS was used to 
elicit requirements in a Critical Infrastructure 
case study.
Related woRK
We are unaware of any single tool purporting to 
support the analysis of usability, requirements, 
and risk analysis. Some coverage is, however, 
provided by existing tools in each of these 
areas, and presented in the following sections.
conceptual tools for usability
Designing usable system requires an early focus 
on users and their goals (Preece et al., 2007). 
Although many engineers consider usability 
as synonymous only with user interface design 
(Seffah & Metzker, 2004), it is also a quality 
concerning the people interacting with these 
interfaces, and how they use them to perform 
work tasks. Unfortunately, we currently lack 
tool-support allowing analysts and developers 
to inform secure system design with usability 
insights.
Qualitative usability data can be repre-
sented as personas: fictitious, specific, concrete 
representations of target users (Pruitt & Adlin, 
2006). By describing how personas carry out 
these scenarios, we can represent usability 
data in a meaningful way to stakeholders and 
inform the subsequent analysis accordingly. A 
step towards managing personas and the sce-
narios they participate in involves devising a 
suitable means of structuring and categorising 
this interaction. Such categorisations might also 
help measure the impact to usability of security 
design decisions, and vice-versa.
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Many tools for Security Requirements Engineer-
ing are general Requirements Management tools, 
which have been augmented for security. Such 
tools are often based on the spreadsheet metaphor, 
where a table is used to enter the attributes of a 
natural language requirement. By applying this 
metaphor, requirement attributes, such as its 
description, type, and rationale, can be quickly 
specified. Unfortunately, the generic strength 
of a Requirements Management tool is also its 
weakness; the lack of distinct semantics means an 
analyst must manually maintain traces between 
requirements and non-requirements artifacts.
Model-based approaches support traceabil-
ity between different artifacts. If a tool conforms 
to the requisite meta-model then, as data is entered 
into the tool, it can be structured in a manner that 
facilitates automated analysis and visualisation. 
Tool-support for model-based approaches exist 
for risk analysis (Braber et al., 2007; Meland et 
al., 2008) and goal modelling (Respect-IT, 2007), 
but the task of integrating different model-based 
approaches for security requirements engineer-
ing is non-trivial. One problem is the diversity 
of the models to be integrated; tools are often 
based on different meta-models, making un-
derstanding and agreeing interfaces difficult. If 
we assert that misuse cases <<threaten>> use 
cases, do we agree what it means for a use case 
to be threatened? Does a misuse case threaten 
the work carried out by a use case, or the assets 
associated with it? Houmb et al. (2009) describes 
some of the challenges faced when integrating 
these different techniques.
One strategy for integrating these ap-
proaches is to consider how Secure Requirements 
Engineering and HCISec might complement each 
other. Thimbleby (2007) argues that usability ap-
proaches are necessary, but far from sufficient for 
critical systems. The sheer size of the state space 
associated with interactive devices is so big that 
empirical evaluation on its own is unsustainable. 
It is, however, possible, to supplement usability 
analysis with basic technical methods.
visualising Secure 
Systems design
Before stakeholders can measure the impact of 
usability of secure system design decisions, they 
need to understand the rationale underpinning 
a design. Previous work has illustrated how 
different visualisation techniques can both 
explain the results of analysis, and explore 
the resulting impact. While we are unaware of 
work purporting to visualise the analysis and 
resulting impact of usability and security, there 
has been work on independently visualising 
analysis in each area.
The canonical visual notation for modelling 
tasks as scenarios is the UML Use Case Diagram. 
These diagrams show the relationship between 
human or non-human actors, represented as 
stick figures, and coherent units of functional-
ity, represented as ellipses. The diagrams have 
also been extended to display Misuse Cases, 
typically represented as black ellipse, and at-
tackers, typically represented as an attacker with 
a filled black head (Alexander, 2002). Røstad 
has proposed an extended notation for dealing 
Misuse Cases, such that threats and vulnerabili-
ties are modelled as separate entities in a Use 
Case Diagram (Røstad, 2006). With the aid of 
stereotyped associations and different attacker 
types, this notation allows more information 
cogent to a risk analysis to be modelled, and 
inside and outside attacks to be distinguished.
Techniques from information visualisation 
have also been used to support risk analysis. 
Hogganvik (2007) has concluded that colours 
are a useful means of distinguishing the value 
of different risks, and Feather et al. has used bar 
charts to portray information from Defect De-
tection and Prevention (DDP) models to make 
problematic areas more evident to stakeholders 
(Feather et al., 2006).
caiRiS
CAIRIS is a step towards tool-support for us-
able secure requirements engineering. CAIRIS 
supports the elicitation of usability, require-
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ments, and risk analysis data before and during 
participative design activities. Data is entered 
into the CAIRIS front-end, and stored in a back-
end database; the constraints in the database 
are based on the IRIS meta-model (Faily & 
Fléchais, 2010).
Requirements management
A recent survey on techniques for describing 
security requirements (Tøndel et al., 2008) 
concluded that there was no consensus on what 
a security requirement is. We have, therefore, 
decided to represent all requirements, including 
security requirements, as natural language text: 
the lingua franca for requirements specifica-
tions in industry. CAIRIS includes an editor 
for specifying natural language requirements, 
which is based on the spreadsheet metaphor; the 
table columns conform to the Volere Require-
ments Shell (Robertson & Robertson, 2009). 
Each table of requirements is associated with 
an asset or an environment. This enables large 
specifications to be structured according to the 
concern most closely related to it.
CAIRIS also supports many of the features 
found in commercial requirements management 
tools, such as versioned changes to require-
ments, forward and backward traceability, and 
automatic requirements document generation. 
CAIRIS does not, however, support ad-hoc 
traceability between all artifacts; almost all 
traceability links are automatically generated 
and maintained as part of the modelling process. 
Manual links can only be created where they 
are meaningful. For example, it is meaningful 
to associate a task with a vulnerability; some 
aspect of a task might be open to exploitation, 
and it is difficult to cull such a relationship from 
the textual narrative of the task. However, it is 
invalid to manually associate a task with a role. 
Although this relationship may exist implicitly, 
it is as a corollary of a relationship between 
tasks and personas. This latter relationship can 
be generated automatically by CAIRIS when 
stating a persona participates in a task.
task analysis
Empirical data about how target users plan to 
use the system-to-be is modelled in CAIRIS 
using personas (Pruitt & Adlin, 2006) and task 
based scenarios (Rosson & Carroll, 2002). These 
personas fulfil one or more roles. Although there 
is no agreed way of measuring the usability of 
a task with respect to its participating personas, 
a number of persona and task attributes match 
attributes found in the ISO 9241-11 (ISO, 1998) 
framework. ISO 92411-11 describes how us-
ability goals can be evaluated using the goals 
of effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction. 
Based on this framework, we have devised a 
set of task usability properties (Figure 1); these 
can be used to evaluate how usable a task is 
to a persona. When defining tasks, these four 
properties are set for each persona participating 
in a scenario. Each of these properties map to 
one of the usability components of ISO 9241-11.
Each property has an associated value x 
which maps to a natural number in the range 0 
≤ x ≤ 3; this corresponds to the qualitative 
values of None, Low, Medium, and High re-
spectively. To ensure equal weighting for all 3 
usability components, the usability of a task Ut 












 is the mean task efficiency, c is 
the mean task satisfaction, and d  is the mean 
task effectiveness. Variables a, b, c, and d refer 
to the task duration, frequency, demands, and 
goal conflict respectively. The mean value is 
taken across all personas carrying out the task 
in question. The higher the value of Ut, the less 
usable a task is for the personas associated with 
it. More meaningful values must be used for 
duration and frequency because values like low, 
medium, and high are ambiguous. For duration, 
60   International Journal of Secure Software Engineering, 1(3), 56-70, July-September 2010
Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global
is prohibited.
the qualitative ratings used are Seconds, Min-
utes, and Hours or Longer are associated with 
the values 1, 2, and 3 respectively. For fre-
quency, the ratings used are Monthly or less, 
Daily - Weekly, and Hourly or more.
When mitigating risks, one or more roles 
are associated with each mitigating countermea-
sure; these roles will, in some way, be directly 
affected by the countermeasure being designed. 
By associating roles with countermeasure within 
IRIS, candidate personas and their tasks can be 
identified. For each task-persona pairing, coun-
termeasure usability properties can be specified.
Based on this countermeasure usability 
data, it is possible to calculate the countermea-
sure usability factor TUt. The right hand side of 










The values are, however, different. a b+
2
 
is the mean contribution to task efficiency, c  
is the mean contribution to task satisfaction, 
and d  is the mean contribution to task effec-
tiveness. Like Ut, the variables a, b, c, and d 
refer to the task duration, frequency, demands, 
and goal conflict respectively. The mean con-
tributing value is taken across all countermea-
sures affecting the task in question. However, 
unlike Ut, each qualitative value x associated 
with a property maps to an integer in the range 
−3 ≤ x ≤ 3.
Based on these equations, we compute the 
task summative usability SUt to be
SU U TU
t t t
= +  
Like Ut, the higher the score, the less usable 
the task is for the associated personas. After 
calculating Ut and SUt, the score is normalised 
to a natural number in the range 0 ≤ n ≤ 9. Given 
the potential of a task to increase or decrease 
usability, this value remains unchanged irre-
spective of it being a high positive or negative 
number.
Figure 1. Task (left) and countermeasure task (right) usability properties
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Risk analysis
In CAIRIS, we define a risk as the likelihood 
of a threat exploiting a vulnerability to cause 
an impact. Threats are synonymous to attacks, 
and vulnerabilities are properties of a system 
making it liable to exploitation.
A risk rating can be assigned based on 
likelihood and severity tables in IEC 61508 
(IEC 1998-2005) (Figure 2). However, this 
rating does not reflect values held about indi-
vidual assets or threats. To score risks with 
respect to the perceived value of the assets 
threatened, we define a security property as a 
row vector c i a o      

 , where c, i, a, and o 
represent the values held for confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and accountability respec-
tively. Each element n is valued 0 ≤ n ≤ 3 based 
on whether the value held for that element is 
none, low, medium or high. The likelihood of 




= −  
where Lt is the likelihood of the threat t associ-
ated with risk r, and mt  is the mean likelihood 
value for the set of countermeasures mitigating 
the likelihood of Lt occurring. The values of Lt 
and mt exist within the range 0 ≤ n ≤ 5, and 
map to the likelihood categories in Figure 2. 
The severity of the vulnerability exposed by 
risk r is computed using the equation
S S m
r v s
= −  
where Sv is the severity of the vulnerability v 
associated with risk r, and ms  is the mean 
severity for the set of countermeasures mitigat-
ing the severity of Sv. Like threat severity, 
vulnerability values exist within the range 0 ≤ 
n ≤ 3 and map to the vulnerability categories 
in Figure 2.
Risk impact is described by a security prop-
erty, representing the values held in the assets 
at risk from risk r. Risk impact is computed 
using the equation
P P P m
r t a p
= × −( )  
where Pt is the security property of the threat 
associated with risk r, Pa is the security prop-
erty of the vulnerable or threatened assets at 
risk, and mp is the mean security property for 
the countermeasures targeting the risk’s threat 
or vulnerability.
Finally, the calculation for the Risk Score 
of risk r, Rr, is computed, as the product of the 
threat likelihood, the severity of the vulnerabil-
ity, and the risk impact to the threatened assets.
R L S P
r r r r
= × ×  
Each element of row vector is added to-
gether, and the sum is normalised to an integer 
between 1 and 9. If, during the above computa-
tions, negative numbers are calculated, these 
values are resolved to 0.
caiRiS modelS
One of the main differences between CAIRIS 
and related tools for security modelling is the 
model-driven nature of visualisation; models 
are automatically generated from specified, 
declarative data rather than via direct manipula-
tion. This frees analysts from the tedious task 
of manually maintaining a variety of different 
models and the traceability relations between 
them.
Data elicited by CAIRIS is stored in a 
MySQL database conforming to the IRIS Meta-
model (Faily & Fléchais, 2010), a conceptual 
model for usable secure requirements engineer-
ing. Rendering a tabular representation of the 
model data using the open-source Graphviz 
framework generates each model view. By us-
ing Graphviz’s xdot output format, the position 
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of different model elements is retained and, 
consequently, hit-testing can be supported in 
CAIRIS model viewer components; this allows 
analysts to click on nodes in a model viewer 
to obtain more information about the related 
model elements.
Several models can be automatically gener-
ated by CAIRIS based on elicited data. These 
are described in the following sections.
asset model
The CAIRIS Asset Model is represented as a 
UML class model, where assets are represented 
as classes. If an asset is used within a task then 
the persona associated with the task is also 
displayed in the asset model as an actor. Simi-
larly, depending on the level of zoom used in 
the model, a comment node is also displayed 
to indicate the traceability origin of the asset 
and its relationship.
Assets may be generated from countermea-
sures as part of risk analysis. If this occurs, then 
an association between the asset at risk and the 
countermeasure protecting it is generated; this 
association is labelled with a <<safeguard>> 
stereotype.
task model
Personas and their task associations are repre-
sented using a modified form of UML Use Case 
diagram, where tasks are modelled as use cases, 
and personas are modelled as actors. This model 
also displays Misuse Cases and the attackers 
who realise them; attackers are displayed as 
actors wearing a black hat and Misuse Cases 
are represented as black ellipses with white text. 
Figure 3 is an example of a CAIRIS task model.
In the same manner that assets are associ-
ated with tasks, Misuse Cases are also, albeit 
indirectly, associated with assets. Each Misuse 
Figure 2. IEC 61508 tables for threat likelihood, vulnerability severity, and risk categorisation
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Case in CAIRIS is associated with a risk and, 
by extension, with a single threat and vulner-
ability. Consequently, if an asset is used by a 
task and also exposed by a vulnerability or 
threatened by threat, then we can model this 
Asset-Misuse Case relationship in CAIRIS. 
Because these associations potentially add to 
model clutter in a large task model, these are 
associations are displayed based on the model’s 
current zoom factor.
goal, obstacle, and 
Responsibility models
We adopt a multi-model view of Requirements 
Engineering based on the goal-oriented KAOS 
methodology (Lamsweerde, 2009). KAOS 
defines goals as prescriptive descriptions of 
system intent, which are used as vehicles for 
refining requirements. The KAOS modelling 
notation is compliant with UML and, by ex-
tension, compatible with modelling notations 
commonly used by industry. The polygon KAOS 
model elements are also comparatively trivial to 
render visually. This is an important property for 
tool-support, which needs to rapidly compute 
and visualise the products of analysis without 
hindering participative design activities.
High-level goals stipulated by stakehold-
ers at the beginning of a project can be refined 
by CAIRIS using goal trees; leaf goals can 
be refined as requirements, which can then 
be operationalised as tasks. Alternatively, a 
bottom up approach may also be taken where 
goals or requirements are elicited from tasks 
and retrofitted into the goal tree.
Obstacles can be identified from require-
ments and goals; these are conditions represent-
ing undesired behaviour and prevent an associ-
ated goal from being achieved (Lamsweerde & 
Letier, 2000). By refining obstacles, candidate 
threats and vulnerabilities may be defined.
Horizontal traceability is implemented us-
ing concern links. If assets or asset relationships 
of concern are identified in goals or tasks, these 
are automatically generated in the asset model.
Risk analysis model
The Risk Analysis model provides a quick-look 
view of the current risk analysis. This model 
only displays the elements of risk analysis, 
and other non-risk analysis elements associ-
ated with them. This view also compresses 
goal trees arising from risk responses, thereby 
making it easier to trace risks to mitigating 
responses, the requirements they treat, and the 
countermeasures they refine.
Risk Analysis model nodes are both colour 
coded and encoding with multidimensional data. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, information about the 
security properties is coded within asset and 
threat elements. Histograms indicate whether 
or not values are held for each property and, 
if so, whether that property is low, medium, or 
high. The colours selected for the confidenti-
ality, integrity, availability, and accountability 
histograms are the 3 primary colours -- red, 
blue, and green -- together with black; the 
use of black and primary colours provide the 
maximum differentiation between property 
types (Tufte, 1990).
Figure 3. Task Model example
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Risk analysis elements are colour coded 
with information, such as threat likelihood, 
vulnerability severity, and risk impact. Threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks are also coloured based 
on their criticality: the more critical the element, 
the deeper the hue of red.
The Risk Analysis model also visualises 
metrics on requirements quality. These metrics 
are based on requirements completeness, the 
presence of an imperative phrase, and ambigu-
ity. These are displayed using cartoon Chernoff 
Faces (Chernoff, 1973), and described in more 
detail by (Wilson et al., 1996). Eye-brow shape 
indicates the completeness of a given require-
ment. If no text is found in certain fields, or 
phrases like TBC, None, or not defined are 
present, the completeness score is marked down 
accordingly, and the eye-brows convey a nega-
tive mood. The eye shape indicates whether or 
not an imperative phrase exists in the require-
ment description. If such a phrase exists then 
the eyes becomes vertically elongated. The 
mouth indicates the presence of weak or fuzzy 
phrases, such as mostly, appropriate, normal, 
or adequate; the presence of these phrases turn 
the smile into a frown.
clutter management
With so much information associated with 
the different model views, visual clutter can 
become a problem as models grow. Minimal 
distinctions in colour can be used to reduce 
visual clutter, and small contrasts enrich the 
visual signal increasing the number of possible 
distinctions (Tufte, 1997). To take advantage 
of this, we map the normalised values for Rr 
and SUt to the respective risk (red) and task 
usability (blue) colour charts. The higher the 
risk or task usability score, the deeper the hue 
of red or blue.
Threat likelihood and vulnerability sever-
ity scores map to a colour chart similar to that 
of risk. An example of how these colours are 
applied to elements on the IRIS risk analysis 
model is provided in Figure 4.
CAIRIS also uses geometric and semantic 
zooming to make efficient use of the available 
viewing area as model data increases. Geometric 
zooming magnifies detail at the cost of loss of 
context; semantic zooming conveys additional 
model information as it is zoomed (Spence, 
2007). The risk analysis model supports 3 
Figure 4. Risk Analysis model before (left) and after (right) risk mitigation
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levels of zooming. At the lowest zoom factor, 
only the most salient elements are displayed. As 
the zoom factor increases, the further elements 
are displayed, together with the associations 
between them. At the highest zoom factor, all 
remaining elements are displayed, together with 
additional information about assets and threats. 
At this level of granularity, textual labels are also 
displayed; at lower levels, such detail would be 
unreadable and distracting. Zooming is also sup-
ported in the task model. Associations between 
personas and attackers and Tasks and Misuse 
Cases respectively are displayed at low zoom 
factors. Associations indicating that a Misuse 
Case threatens a Task, or a Task mitigates a 
Misuse Case are displayed at medium zoom 
factors. Associations indicating assets used by a 
Task, exploited or threatened by a Misuse Case, 
or assets mitigating a Misuse Case are displayed 
at high zoom factors. Figure 3 illustrates a task 
model at a high zoom factor.
Even with support for zooming, clutter 
remains a problem in large models when viewed 
at a high zoom factor. Consequently, filtering is 
also supported in certain models. Models can be 
filtered by task in the task model, and by node 
name and type, i.e., risk, threat, vulnerability, 
etc, in the risk analysis model; in these models, 
only the filtered model node and associated 
nodes are displayed. In the goal model, filtering 
is supported by goal name; when the filter is 
applied, the goal tree is re-displayed such that 
the filtered node becomes the root node.
caSe Study
In this section, we report on a case study where 
CAIRIS was used to support the specification 
of requirements for a central repository for 
control software; this repository was designed 
to support the work of instrument technicians 
at a UK water company.
Water and sewage treatment is controlled 
by a substantial amount of control software. 
This software runs on many different devices 
and locations across wide geographic areas. As 
part of their responsibility for maintaining the 
water network, instrument technicians make 
software modifications to telemetry outstations, 
PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers), and 
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acqui-
sition) workstations. Without a central strategy 
for controlling such software, water treatment 
integrity may be compromised if software is 
lost, or incorrect software is accidentally, or 
deliberately, installed on critical instrumenta-
tion. However, because maintaining the water 
network can be physically and mentally taxing, 
any new technology needs to be situated for the 
contexts within which these technicians work.
Following an initial scoping workshop, 
empirical data was elicited from 3 contextual 
interviews (Holtzblatt & Jones, 1993) with in-
strument technicians, 2 on-site qualitative inter-
views, and 2 telephone interviews with related 
stakeholders. Transcripts of these interviews 
were analysed using qualitative data analysis, 
the results of which were used to identify the 
behavioural characteristics of potential users. 
From these behaviour characteristics, a number 
of personas were developed. This qualitative 
data was also used to inform a number of can-
didate requirements, vulnerabilities, and threats.
Three one-day workshops were held to 
carry out requirements analysis; participants 
included instrument technicians, software engi-
neers, IT support staff, and information security 
officers. Each workshop began by validating the 
results of previous sessions before undertaking 
requirements analysis, and supplemental task 
and risk analysis. CAIRIS was used by a joint 
facilitator/scribe in each of these workshops to 
specify the artifacts of task, requirements, and 
risk analysis, and display different models to 
facilitate discussion and subsequent analysis 
activities.
For the purposes of brevity, this section 
focuses on how CAIRIS was used to elicit and 
analyse requirements relating to the modifica-
tion of PLC software.
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category definition and 
asset modelling
In the initial workshop, definitions were agreed 
and candidate assets were elicited. The mean-
ings of Low, Medium, and High values were 
agreed for security properties, and categorical 
values for vulnerability severity were agreed 
and entered into CAIRIS. The IEC and ISO 
categories for threat likelihood and usability 
were also discussed with participants.
At this early stage, information about as-
sets of value was also elicited and entered into 
CAIRIS. For this example, we focus only on 
two particular assets: PLC control software 
and repository access credentials. The security 
properties associated with PLC Software were 
Integrity (High), Availability (High), and Ac-
countability (Medium). The properties associ-
ated with the repository access credentials were 
Confidentiality (High), and Availability (High).
usability analysis
For reasons of brevity, we focus on the work 
of Barry, the primary persona in the case study. 
Barry represented an instrument technician who 
modifies software as part of his day-to-day 
work. In several tasks, Barry made infrastructure 
changes to plant equipment, which led to con-
trol software modifications and, consequently, 
interaction with the software repository. One of 
these tasks, Modify PLC Software, began with 
Barry examining the details of the task on the 
SAP-based planning system, determining the 
required plant changes, and speaking to plant 
operators about the work. Barry then carried 
out the necessary modification work and com-
missioned (tested) the changes. When this task 
was completed to the satisfaction of the plant 
operators, Barry closed the job on the planning 
system, and uploaded the modified programs 
to the software repository.
Given Barry’s profile, this task takes sev-
eral hours, but only occurs on an infrequent 
basis. Due to the amount of work involved in 
this task, coupled with the importance of the 
task itself, this is a high demand task, which 
does not interfere with his goals. Based on this 

















    
    
 
goal and Requirement elicitation
From the scoping workshop, a high-level goal 
for maintaining control software was elicited; 
this was broken down to sub-goals for main-
taining different classes of software. In this 
case study, we focus only on the elicitation of 
security requirements following the analysis of 
a goal for downloading PLC software.
In this simple example, a number of 
functional requirements (PLCS-2, PLCS-3, 
and PLCS-4) were directly elicited from the 
Download PLC software goal. However, in 
this context, an instrument technician must be 
authorised to make any software downloads and 
potential software modifications. We chose to 
generate obstacles on each of these goals to ex-
plore their consequences. Workshop participants 
were interested in exploring the unauthorised 
access of repository login credentials as a cause 
of unauthorised downloading. While analysing 
this goal, the assumption that organisational 
login credentials would be used for accessing 
the software repository was explicated. This 
domain assumption was modelled elsewhere in 
the goal model, and further obstacle refinement 
proceeded on the basis of this assumption. A 
number of leaf obstacles, one of which pertained 
to login credentials sharing, were identified. 
Based on this obstacle, a Credentials Sharing 
vulnerability was specified. Given the resources 
these credentials facilitate access to this vulner-
ability was scored as Critical.
The Chernoff Faces for these requirements 
in Figure 4 suggest quality problems with some 
of these requirements. In some cases, the eye-
brow shape indicates that attributes, such as 
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fit criteria and rationale, are missing in some 
cases. In the case of PLCS-3, the requirements 
description (“A user shall be able to download 
the latest version of the PLC software for a site”) 
is also ambiguous. This is due to the presence 
of the weak-phrase be able to, which is open 
to multiple interpretations.
Risk analysis
Not all threats and vulnerabilities arose from 
requirements analysis. A Logic Bomb threat was 
defined based on the concern that an inside-
attacker instrument technician might inten-
tionally plant malicious code in PLC software 
to compromise water treatment. An example 
of such malicious logic involves turning off 
particular pumps in a water treatment plant at 
a designated time late one evening; this ensures 
the malevolent instrument technician receives a 
financially lucrative call-out to fix the problem. 
Alternatively, if another instrument technician’s 
credentials are used, the Logic Bomb could 
undermine the company’s confidence in his 
abilities. In the worse case scenario, turning 
off critical safety controls can lead to pollution 
of the water supply or substantial environment 
damage if raw sewage is released into the sur-
rounding ecosystem. When carrying out this 
threat, the attacker wishes to hide his Logic 
Bomb within an innocuous code change carried 
out by another instrument technician. As such, 
the attacker looks to target the accountability 
property of this asset. All participants agreed 
that, dangerous as this threat is, its likelihood 
was low.
We defined a Plant Logic Bomb via bor-
rowed credential risk. This risk occurs when 
an attacker carries out a Logic Bomb threat by 
exploiting the Credentials Sharing vulnerability. 
CAIRIS assessed this risk quantitatively by 
calculating its risk score. The likelihood and 
severity scores mapped to 1 and 2 respectively. 
The threat targeted only the accountability 
property of PLC software. The Windows login 
credentials, used to access the repository, are 
exploited by the Credentials Sharing vulnerabil-
ity. Using this information, CAIRIS calculated 
the risk score Rr:
L L m
S S m
P P P m
r t t
r v s









   
   
   
   






([ ] [ ])
[ ]
[
0 0 0 3 0 3 3 2
0 0 0 6
1 2 0 0
      
      





R L S V
r r r r
0 6
0 0 0 12
 




After rounding Rr down, the normalised 
score resolved to 9.
This risk was mitigated with a detective 
mitigation response, such that occurrences of 
this risk would be detected after the event. A 
goal was generated to reflect the objective of 
detecting this risk and, after goal refinement, 
requirements for peer-reviewing PLC software 
changes were elicited. One of these require-
ments stipulated that an instrument technician 
making a software modification cannot be the 
technician selected to carry out a peer review. 
Based on this, a SAP-Repository bridge coun-
termeasure was defined. This countermeasure 
was a software component for cross-checking 
a peer reviewer with an instrument technician 
responsible for a modification. This counter-
measure is considered reasonably effective at 
targeting the Logic Bomb threat, motivating the 
value of 2 (Medium) for mt . This countermea-
sure also fosters a high value of accountability, 
giving rise to a score of [ ]0 0 0 3   formp . Based 
on this information, the risk score can now be 
re-evaluated.
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These results show that while the account-
ability security value remains threatened, the 
likelihood of the threat was rendered inert, 
thereby reducing the risk score to the lowest 
possible value. As this countermeasure appeared 
to be effective, a new asset was defined for 
this component. The security property of this 
asset was based on the values placed on the 
countermeasure.
This countermeasure also positively influ-
enced the task of modifying PLC software. A 
software component linking the repository with 
the SAP based work system means that job data 
can be used to support modification comments 
and, potentially, the job can be closed off by 
uploading a modification to the repository; this 
changes leads to the task being slightly less 
mentally taxing. Therefore, the summative task 








      







The risk analysis model before and after 






ing different colours; the risk node colour has 
changed from a dark to a light shade of red, 
while the task node in the mitigated model is 
now a lighter shade of blue.
concluSion
Reasoning about security and usability is a 
challenge during requirements analysis, not 
least because analyst bias and data explosion 
can occur as specification and design activities 
progress. This challenge motivates the need 
for tool support to manage the results of this 
analysis, and use these results to further inform 
security and usability requirements analysis.
This paper has introduced CAIRIS: 
tool-support for usable secure requirements 
engineering. Although CAIRIS incorporates 
much of the functionality found in classic Re-
quirements Management tools, elicited data is 
structured using a conceptual model for usable 
security. This allows CAIRIS to analyse risk and 
task analysis data as it is specified, and auto-
matically generate different views of collected 
data. Our approach has shown that empirical 
usability and risk analysis data can be put to 
good use by applying simple qualitative and 
quantitative techniques to evaluate risks and 
tasks. By using this data with simple visualisa-
tion techniques, we can validate assumptions 
underpinning analysis, and explore the impact 
of certain specification and design designs.
Future work will examine the challenges 
associated with integrating CAIRIS with other 
tools, which support downstream secure soft-
ware engineering activities.
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